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Introduction
How do oligopolistic …rms react to an exogenous cost-push shock when they have a chance to undertake a costly action to o¤set it? The question is relevant as …rms challenged by a loss in competitiveness induced by an increase in production costs are increasingly induced to restore the pre-shock level of pro…tability by acting on other parts of the cost structure, rather than revising their pricing policy. Actions of this nature are seldom costless.
We propose an analysis of this issue in a simple Cournot duopoly model a¤ected by a shock increasing the level of marginal cost by the same amount for both …rms, each of which has to evaluate the pro…tability of spending a …xed amount of resources to bring back its marginal cost to the initial level, in a fully noncooperative game. Intuitively, the equilibrium outcome depends on the level of the adjustment cost, and the …rms' incentives to undertake this costly venture fade away as it increases. In particular, there exists an intermediate range of values of the adjustment cost in which two asymmetric equilibria obtain in pure strategies, such that one …rm adjusts while the other doesn't. Interestingly enough, such asymmetry may indeed turn out to be aligned with social preferences, so that a government would raise no objection to an equilibrium outcome characterised by asymmetric levels of productive e¢ ciency and investments.
After carrying out the analysis of the duopoly model, we propose di¤erent interpretations of the source and nature of the cost-push shock as well as the reaction to it, linking the ensuing partial equilibrium analysis typically belonging to the theory of industrial organization to far-reaching discussions about the in ‡uence of labour unions on …rms' innovation incentives (Ulph and Ulph, 1998), the neoclassical adjustment mechanism to the long-run equilibrium after a permanent demand shock (Woodford, 2003) and resilience (Lee et al., 2013 ).
The model
The economy is composed by two identical …rms (indexed by i = 1; 2) producing a homogeneous good. Consider a time horizon consisting of three periods, t 1; t and t + 1: At time t 1; demand and cost functions are respectively p = a Q = a q 1 q 2 and C i = cq i , where p denotes the price of the product and q i is …rm i's quantity. Marginal cost is given by parameter c 2 (0; a). Firms play à la Cournot-Nash, and therefore individual pro…ts at time t 1 read (t 1) = (a c) 2 =9: Then, between t 1 and t (say, overnight), the industry is hit by an exogenous shock shifting the marginal cost 1 up to c 2 (c; a) and individual pro…ts down to (t) = (a c) 2 =9 < (t 1) : Now assume the existence of a symmetric lump-sum adjustment cost k > 0 that, if paid by the …rm, is going to restore the initial level of the marginal cost and therefore also pro…ts (net of k) at time t + 1. In other words, …rms may implement a costly action so as to o¤set the initial increase in marginal cost from c to c. There are many ways we can rationalize such a cost: R&D activities for a process innovation measured by c c; or a bargaining process aimed at reducing input costs (labor, capital or raw materials), assuming they are exchanged in non-competitive markets. For our purpose, all that matters is that such a reaction to the shock is costly. If both …rms decide to implement the reaction after the marginal cost shock has occurred, then at t + 1 individual pro…ts are given by the following expression:
where superscript AA mnemonics for symmetric adjustment. Pro…ts AA are positive for all
For any k > k AA ; the size of the shock is large enough to eliminate any incentive for …rms to carry out the symmetric adjustment. If both …rms decide instead not to adjust, then pro…ts remain at the level identi…ed by (t), and can be usefully relabelled as
where superscript N N indicates that neither …rm is adjusting. In case of asymmetric adjustment, we identify with superscript A the …rm which, after the cost-push shock, decides to pay k to bring its marginal cost back to the initial level c; and with superscript N A the …rm which does not. In order for the industry to remain a duopoly with both …rms selling positive output levels, we impose the condition c 2 (c; (a + c) =2). Borrowing from the jargon typical of the literature on the economics of innovation, this assumption entails that the shock is minor, or non-drastic. 2 Asymmetric equilibrium pro…ts are the following:
For all c 2 (c; (a + c) =2) ; (5) is strictly positive. The positivity of (4) is ensured for all
This condition provides an upper bound on the size of the adjustment cost in the asymmetric case; if it is violated, no …rm will unilaterally undertake the adjustment. Having now fully characterised the spectrum of market subgames and their outcomes, we may design a reduced-form representation of the game 2 See, for instance, the debate on the persistence of monopoly (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1983) , where the same asymmetric Cournot duopoly is used to assess whether an incumbent may invest more than a potential entrant in order to keep monopoly power. For more, see Tirole (1988) .
following the rise in marginal cost, where each …rm has to decide whether to adjust or not to the cost-push shock, i.e., whether to pay k and bring back marginal costs to c. Such a reduced form is represented by Matrix 1 de…ned in the binary space of discrete strategies (A; N ) ; and de…nes a noncooperative game with complete, symmetric and imperfect information (i.e., …rms move simultaneously).
The equilibrium outcome(s) and Pareto-e¢ ciency (whenever the latter property is indeed relevant) are determined by the signs of the following expressions:
Expression (7) measures the incentive for a …rm to pay the adjustment cost k when the rival does not react to the cost-push shock. If it is positive then the …rm unilaterally adjusts, otherwise it doesn't. Expression (8) tells us whether for either …rm it is convenient to reduce marginal cost to its preshock level when also the rival does, and this happens only if the r.h.s. is positive. Finally, expression (9) allows to Pareto-rank the symmetric payo¤s appearing along the main diagonal of Matrix 1. If it is positive, the symmetric adjustment is always Pareto-superior to the symmetric lack thereof.
It can be easily checked that (7) is positive for all k 2 0; k ; where:
Expression (8) is positive for all k 2 0; e k ; where:
Finally, (9) is positive for all k 2 0; b k ; where:
The characterization of the equilibrium of the game is therefore given by the size of the adjustment cost k with respect to the three above thresholds. According to that, in fact, expressions (7)- (9) assume di¤erent signs and consequently give rise to di¤erent strategic interaction's outcome. Before analysing that issue, it is necessary to order k 1 ; k 2 and k 3 ; as we do in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 k > e k > b k for any a > c > c:
Proof. Since c > c; k is obviously higher than e k. Also, we know that e k b k = (2a + c 3c)(c c)=9 > 0 as c > c and, the cost di¤erential being non-drastic, c 2 (c; (a + c) =2) to ensure the non-negativity of outputs in the asymmetric cases. Finally, k > b k is ensured by the fact that k b k = (2a 3c + c)(c c)=9 > 0 because a > c > c.
Additionally, it is obvious that k AN > k AA > e k > b k for all a > c > c;
while comparing k AA and k one …nds the following:
The opposite holds for all c 2 ((a + 3c) =4; a) :
Having established that, we are ready to characterize the equilibrium according to the size of the adjustment cost. This is done in Figure 1 In area I, (A; A) is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium at the intersection of dominant strategies, and it is Pareto-e¢ cient for …rms.
In area II, (A; A) is again the unique pure-strategy equilibrium at the intersection of dominant strategies, but it is Pareto-e¢ cient as Matrix 1 portrays a prisoners'dilemma.
In area III, Matrix 1 is a chicken game with two pure-strategy equilibria along the secondary diagonal, (A; N A) and (N A; A).
In area IV, (N A; N A) is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium at the intersection of dominant strategies, and it is Pareto-e¢ cient for …rms.
The intuitive interpretation of Proposition 3 is straightforward: as the reaction to the cost-push shock becomes more costly, …rms obviously are less inclined to undertake the investment required to bring marginal cost back to its initial level, and this makes it harder for the industry to symmetrically adjust as k increases. In the range k 2 e k; min k; k AA ; the industry may do so taking into consideration the equilibrium in mixed strategies, which becomes relevant in presence of the two pure-strategy equilibria generated by the chicken game. Having dealt with …rms'pro…t incentives, we have to assess the social welfare consequences of adjustment (or the lack thereof), in order to ascertain (i) whether it is socially desirable, and, if so, (ii) whether pro…t and social incentives are reciprocally aligned or not.
Welfare appraisal
Social welfare is de…ned as the sum of industry pro…ts and consumer surplus. In each of the three relevant cases under consideration, the social welfare level is
It is worth noting that the above expressions are strictly positive for all k 2 0; k AA and all c 2 (c; (a + 3c) =4) since in this region pro…ts are strictly positive. From expressions (14-16), we obtain the following:
and it is quickly established that
This exercise gives rise to the picture represented in Figure 2 , with four relevant areas:
Accordingly, we may formulate:
Depending on the level of the adjustment cost k, social preferences can be summarised as follows:
In area A, symmetric adjustment by the entire industry is socially e¢ -cient.
In areas B and C, asymmetric adjustment by a single …rm is socially e¢ cient.
In area D, it is socially e¢ cient that neither …rm adjusts. Figure 2 Welfare analysis in the space (c; k).
As for …rms'incentives, also here we see that -not surprisingly -symmetric adjustment is e¢ cient provided that k is su¢ ciently low. The last step consists in tackling the issue of the alignment between private and social incentives. This task can be performed putting together all of the critical threshold of k in a single graph. This is done in Figure 3 , revealing that there exist three areas wherein alignment does emerge:
In area ( ) ; identi…ed by k 2 0; min
; the unique equilibrium (A; A) involving adjustment by the entire industry is Paretoe¢ cient for …rms as well as from a social standpoint.
In area ( ) ; asymmetric adjustment by a single …rm is the outcome of the chicken game, and is also socially optimal.
In area ( ) ; (N; N ) ; i.e., no adjustment by either …rm, is the unique equilibrium generated by …rms'strategic interplay and is also socially e¢ cient. 
Implications and concluding remarks
In the foregoing exposition, we did not elaborate on the source of the shock a¤ecting …rms'marginal cost. This can be generated by …scal policy actions (such as increase in tax rates on production or inputs) or institutional features (labor unions'demands causing an increase in real wage). Or, additionally, it may be the outcome of an increase in the cost (or scarcity) of raw materials or fossil fuels, with analogous consequences. Adopting a wider perspective ranging far outside the boundaries of partial equilibrium analysis, the role played by cost-push shocks has indeed received a great deal of attention in the macroeconomic literature (see Ravenna and Walsh, 2006; Chowdhury et al., 2006; Henzerl, 2009 ). If these motives lie behind the marginal cost increase, then the adjustment cost required to bring it back to its initial level can be interpreted as either an R&D investment or the cost implied by the bargaining process between …rms and labor unions to reach an agreement on the reconstruction of the status quo ante.
